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Abstract 
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally 
different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the 
same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, 
strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple 
two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify 
contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new 
examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design 
applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research. 
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1. Introduction 
A contest is a game in which players expend costly resources, such as effort, money or 
time, in order to win a prize. Since the seminal papers of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), many different contests have been introduced to the literature. For example, Skaperdas 
(1992) studies contests where the final payoff depends on the residual resources and the prize. 
Chung (1996) and Kaplan et al. (2002) examine contests with effort-dependent prizes. Lee and 
Kang (1998) and Baye et al. (2005) study contests with rank-order spillovers. Although these 
contests are intuitively and structurally very different, they often share common links. 
There are several studies that establish common links between different contests. For 
example, Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between a rank-order tournament of Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) and an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). Baye et al. (2012) show the 
connection between the all-pay auction and pricing games (Varian, 1980; Rosenthal, 1980). 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) show how an R&D race between two players which is modeled as a 
rank-order tournament is equivalent to a rent-seeking contest.1 Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify 
conditions under which research tournament models (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999) and patent 
race models (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) are strategically equivalent to the rent-seeking contest. 
These duality results permit one to apply results derived in the rent-seeking contest literature to 
the innovation, patent race, and rank-order tournament models, and vice versa. 
In this paper we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be 
strategically and effort equivalent. We consider a two-player Tullock-type contest, where 
outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. 
                                                 
1 Jia (2008) extends the result by proving a more general equivalence between a rank-order tournament and a rent-
seeking contest. Fu and Lu (2012) shows that the rent-seeking contest can further include auctions with pre-
investment (Tan, 1992). Similarly, Cason et al. (2012) links the rent-seeking contest to a proportional-prize contest. 
Chowdhury (2009) demonstrates the connection between all-pay auctions (Siegel, 2009) and capacity-constrained 
price contests (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1996). 
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Under this structure, we identify strategically equivalent contests that generate the same best 
response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, the strategically 
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. 
It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned studies establish links between 
different families of contests, such as all-pay auctions, rent-seeking contests, and rank-order 
tournaments. The main result of this paper is conceptually different from the findings of the 
previous studies. In particular, we show that even within the same family of Tullock-type 
contests, different kinds of contests might produce the same best response functions and the 
same equilibrium efforts (although not necessarily the same payoffs). 
Tullock (1980) introduced a contest model in which resources expended by a player 
improves the probability of winning the contest, but can never make the winning probability 
certain. These types of contests are characterized with high volume of noise in the outcome. 
Rent-seeking, legal disputes and sports competitions are often modeled using the Tullock contest 
model. In a simple two-player lottery Tullock contest, the best response curves are inverted U-
shaped, implying that best responses are first strategic complements and then strategic substitute. 
It is also the case that a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, in which each player 
expends a quarter of the prize. 
Since the seminal work by Tullock, numerous studies modified the original model to 
incorporate various structural and policy related issues such as tax/subsidy (Glazer and Konrad, 
1999), endogenous prize (Chung, 1996; Amegashie, 1999), depreciation (Alexeev and Leitzel, 
1996), spillover (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), reimbursement (Matros and Armanios, 
2009), externality (Lee and Kang, 1998), liability structure (Skaperdas and Gan, 1995), litigation 
issues (Farmer and Pecorino, 1999) – to name a few (see Konrad, 2009 for an extensive review). 
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Although these models use the same framework of the Tullock contest, the final outcomes are 
often very different. To the best of our knowledge, no study tried to examine possible 
equivalence among the aforementioned models. 
Introducing equivalence among Tullock type contests is important for a number of 
reasons. First, there exists a substantial literature modeling the rules of the contest as an 
endogenous choice of a contest designer (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein and Nitzan, 2006; 
Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and Tonis, 2013). A contest designer can choose the 
parameters of the model to maximize the total rent dissipation (as in the case of rent-seeking), or 
maximize the equilibrium highest effort (as in R&D races), or minimize the total equilibrium 
effort (as in electoral races), or simply to enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that it 
is possible for a contest designer to achieve different goals using strategically equivalent contests. 
For example, the contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that 
generates the same equilibrium efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected 
payoffs for contestants. We show, in subsequent sections, that indeed such opportunity may exist. 
Under certain conditions, for example, a contest designer may prefer to implement a limited 
liability contest (Skaperdas and Gan, 1995) than a contest that imposes full liability on 
contestants. Finally, certain contests may be not feasible (or too costly) to implement in the field 
due to regulatory restrictions and the possibility of collusion among contestants. However, such 
restrictions may not necessarily apply to other strategically equivalent contests. We show, for 
example, that a contest with endogenous valuation (Amegashie, 1999) that may be hard to 
regulate, is equivalent to a contest with a simple taxation rule (Glazer and Konrad, 1999).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model; 
Section 3 specifies the definitions of equivalence and provides with the conditions to achieve 
 5 
them. Section 4 describes contests from literature that are strategically equivalent to the original 
Tullock contest, as well as introduces a set of modified Tullock type contests that are 
strategically equivalent to each other. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Following Baye et al. (2005, 2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a, 2011b), we 
consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players, denoted by 𝑖 and 𝑗, value the winning 
and the losing prizes as 𝑊 > 0  and 𝐿 ∈ ℝ , with 𝑊 > 𝐿 . Players simultaneously and 
independently expend efforts 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0. The probability of player 𝑖 winning the contest 
is defined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980): 
 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑥𝑖/(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)     if  𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 ≠ 0
1/2                     if  𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0
      (1) 
Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player 𝑖 is a linear function of prizes, 
own effort, and the effort of the rival: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗            with probability          𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗              with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (2) 
where 𝛼1 , 𝛼2  are cost parameters ( 𝛼1 < 0 , 𝛼2 ≤ 0 ), and 𝛽1 ∈ ℝ , 𝛽2 ∈ ℝ  are spillover 
parameters. We define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω) , where Ω =
{𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽1, 𝛽2} is a set of parameters. All parameters in Ω and the contest success function 
are common knowledge. Players are risk neutral, therefore the expected payoff for player 𝑖 is 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) =
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗) +
𝑥𝑗
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗)   (3) 
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where (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) ≠ (0,0). For 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0, the expected payoff is 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) = (𝑊 + 𝐿)/2.
2 
Player 𝑖’s best response is derived by maximizing 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) with respect to 𝑥𝑖: 
𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹 = {−𝑥𝑗 + √
{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}𝑥𝑗
2−{𝑊−𝐿}𝑥𝑗
𝛼1
    if  𝑥𝑗 ≤
𝑊−𝐿
{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}
0                                          otherwise
  (4) 
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) show that although the payoff function (3) is not 
globally concave, the first order condition and the resulting best response function (4) are 
sufficient for an equilibrium to exist. The restriction needed for the best response function to be 
well defined, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 ≤
𝑊−𝐿
{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}
 , is weaker than the condition needed for the payoff 
function to be concave in the relevant region and as a result, when the best response is positive 
then solving the best response functions will give us an equilibrium. Moreover, under the 
appropriate restrictions, i.e., (𝛽2 − 𝛼1) ≥ 0 and −(3𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0, there is a unique 
symmetric equilibrium defined by: 
𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥 =
(𝑊−𝐿)
−(3𝛼1+𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
.       (5) 
Given the symmetric equilibrium (5), the equilibrium payoff is 
𝐸∗(𝜋) =
(𝛽2−𝛼1)(𝑊−𝐿)
−(3𝛼1+𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
+ 𝐿.        (6) 
The contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω), defined by (1) and (2), may also generate asymmetric equilibria.3 
Since in the current study we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium, we impose further 
                                                 
2 Risk neutrality is crucial, as elaborated in the discussion section, for closed form solutions and results of this 
analysis. If the players are not risk neutral, then it is possible that players exert different effort in equilibrium (than 
the one derived under risk neutrality) and there are multiple equilibria (Cornes and Hartley, 2012).  
3 Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b) show that asymmetric equilibria, in which one player exerts very high effort 
and another player exerts very low effort can arise in strictly restrictive cases (such as when the marginal cost of 
losing the contest is substantially higher than the marginal cost of winning the contest). In this study we focus on the 
more general case of symmetric equilibrium that allows for cleaner algebra, while not compromising on basic 
intuitions. 
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restriction (5𝛼1 − 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0 , derived by Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b), to 
guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
 
3. Equivalent Contests 
In this section, we define strategically equivalent contests and show the required 
parametric restrictions to obtain the equivalence. We start by providing a definition of strategic 
equivalence. 
Definition 1: Contests are strategically equivalent if they generate the same best response 
functions. 
This definition of strategic equivalence comes directly from Morris and Ui (2004) who 
provide a general characterization of best-response equivalent games. It is, however, different 
from the definition used in Baye and Hoppe (2003) in which games are strategically equivalent 
when they generate the same expected payoff functions, and thus the same equilibrium payoffs. 
Here, we use a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence, namely the best response 
equivalence. It is usually the case in the contest design literature that a contest designer chooses 
the rules of the contest to induce a specific behavior of contestants (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; 
Epstein and Nitzan, 2006) while being indifferent towards the resulting payoffs of contestants. 
Thus, it seems appropriate to have a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that 
mainly relates to strategic behavior of contestants and not their payoffs.4 
To demonstrate strategic equivalence, let us now consider two contests Γ𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐴) and 
Γ𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵), where Ω𝑘 = {𝑊𝑘, 𝐿𝑘 , 𝛼1
𝑘, 𝛼2
𝑘, 𝛽1
𝑘, 𝛽2
𝑘} for 𝑘 = 𝐴, 𝐵. From equation (4), the necessary 
                                                 
4 However, in many cases (e.g. for welfare and/or fairness purposes) a contest designer does care about the resulting 
payoffs of contestants. Therefore, using only the strict definition of strategic equivalence is not without costs, and 
one may use a more restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that also requires the equivalence of payoffs (see 
Definition 3). 
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and sufficient condition for contests Γ𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐴) and Γ𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵) to be strategically equivalent, 
i.e., to have the same best response functions, is the following: 
(𝛼1
𝐴−𝛼2
𝐴)−(𝛽1
𝐴−𝛽2
𝐴)
𝛼1
𝐴 =
(𝛼1
𝐵−𝛼2
𝐵)−(𝛽1
𝐵−𝛽2
𝐵)
𝛼1
𝐵   and   
(𝑊𝐴−𝐿𝐴)
𝛼1
𝐴 =
(𝑊𝐵−𝐿𝐵)
𝛼1
𝐵 .   (7) 
Intuitively, (7) describes the conditions for which the two best response functions become 
the same. The second condition of (7) essentially shows that the winning to losing prize 
difference, scaled by the winning marginal cost, needs to be the same. Whereas the first 
condition shows that the winning to losing marginal cost versus spillover (again scaled by the 
winning marginal cost) should be the same for the two strategically equivalent contests. Hence, it 
may be possible that both the marginal costs as well as the spillover values in one contest are 
higher than the same in another contest, but still the two contests are strategically equivalent. It 
also reiterates the fact that only the winning and losing prize value differences, and not the 
absolute valuations, matter.  
Next, we define effort equivalent contests. 
Definition 2: Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts. 
From equation (5), the necessary and sufficient condition for contests Γ𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐴) and 
Γ𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵) to be effort equivalent is the following: 
(𝑊𝐴−𝐿𝐴)
−(3𝛼1
𝐴+𝛼2
𝐴)−(𝛽1
𝐴−𝛽2
𝐴)
=
(𝑊𝐵−𝐿𝐵)
−(3𝛼1
𝐵+𝛼2
𝐵)−(𝛽1
𝐵−𝛽2
𝐵)
.      (8) 
Intuitively, (8) shows that the winning and losing prize value differences scaled by 
winning to losing marginal cost versus spillover parameters need to be the same for the two 
contests to produce the same equilibrium effort. 
Generally, strategic equivalence (Definition 1) is a stronger condition than effort 
equivalence (Definition 2) because it requires different contests to generate exactly the same best 
response functions, and as a consequence the same equilibrium efforts. However, given that in 
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our analysis we impose restrictions to guarantee that only the unique and symmetric equilibrium 
(5) exists, strategic equivalence implies effort equivalence.5 It is also important to emphasize that 
without spillovers, effort equivalence is the same as the revenue equivalence, since revenue of a 
contest designer is simply the sum of all individual efforts (Baron and Myerson, 1982; 
Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).6 
In addition to strategic and effort equivalence, we also define payoff equivalent contests. 
Definition 3: Contests are payoff equivalent if they generate the same expected payoffs. 
From equation (6), the necessary and sufficient condition for contests Γ𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐴) and 
Γ𝐵(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵)  to be payoff equivalent, i.e., to generate the same equilibrium payoffs, is the 
following: 
(𝛽2
𝐴−𝛼1
𝐴)(𝑊𝐴−𝐿𝐴)
−(3𝛼1
𝐴+𝛼2
𝐴)−(𝛽1
𝐴−𝛽2
𝐴)
+ 𝐿𝐴 =
(𝛽2
𝐵−𝛼1
𝐵)(𝑊𝐵−𝐿𝐵)
−(3𝛼1
𝐵+𝛼2
𝐵)−(𝛽1
𝐵−𝛽2
𝐵)
+ 𝐿𝐵.     (9) 
Similar to (7) and (8), the equivalence condition (9) can be interpreted as the following: 
the losing prize is a certain prize, along with that there is a possibility to win the difference of the 
winning and losing prize, but with an associated cost. The first component in both sides of 
equation (9) shows the expected payoff and the second component is the certain losing payoff. 
Understandably, the sum of the two is the same for two payoff equivalent contests.  
It is easy to verify that strategic equivalence (Definition 1) does not automatically imply 
payoff equivalence (Definition 3). As we show in the next section, depending on the cost and 
spillover parameters in Ω, one strategically equivalent contest can generate higher payoff than 
another.  
                                                 
5 If two contests generate exactly the same best response functions, then the best response functions also intersect at 
the same point – generating the same equilibrium output. 
6 In contests with spillovers there are different ways to define revenue, and thus effort equivalence may not imply 
revenue equivalence. For example, revenue can be defined as the sum of individual efforts and both positive and 
negative spillovers, or as the sum of efforts and only positive spillovers. Such alternative definitions of revenue 
would require different conditions for revenue equivalence. In this paper, however, we focus only on effort 
equivalence since eliciting individual efforts is usually the main objective of a contest designer. 
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Finally, to simplify our analysis we assume that all alternative contests have the same 
winning prize and the same losing prize, i.e., 𝑊𝐴 = 𝑊𝐵 = 𝑊  and 𝐿𝐴 = 𝐿𝐵 = 𝐿 . This 
assumption is intuitive when the contest designer has specific pre-defined prizes which he can 
use to design a contest.7 Given this assumption, strategic equivalence condition (7) and effort 
equivalence condition (8) are simplified to the following condition: 
𝛽2
𝐴 − 𝛽1
𝐴 − 𝛼2
𝐴 = 𝛽2
𝐵 − 𝛽1
𝐵 − 𝛼2
𝐵  and   𝛼1
𝐴 = 𝛼1
𝐵.     (10) 
In the rest of the paper, we follow a simple two-step procedure to find strategically 
equivalent contests to a particular baseline contest. First, we derive the best response function of 
the baseline contest as in equation (4). Second, from the best response function of the baseline 
contest we derive the restrictions needed, as in (10), for a more general family of contests to 
generate the same best response functions. This simple procedure is used throughout our 
analysis.  
 
4. Equivalent Contests 
We begin with the original contest of Tullock (1980) as the baseline contest in Section 
4.1, and describe contests from literature that are strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest. 
In Section 4.2, we introduce a set of modified Tullock type contests that are strategically 
equivalent to each other. 
 
4.1. Original Tullock Contest 
In the standard rent-seeking contest, introduced by Tullock (1980), there is no losing 
prize and regardless of the outcome of the contest, both players forgo their efforts. In such a case, 
                                                 
7 This specification is more restrictive than when the designer has the total prize value the same for two contests 
(i.e., 𝑊𝐴 + 𝐿𝐴 = 𝑊𝐵 + 𝐿𝐵), but can allocate the winning and losing prize according to the contest. However, these 
two specifications converge when there is no losing prize (i.e., 𝐿𝐴 = 𝐿𝐵 = 0). 
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the winning prize value 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = −1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The 
payoff for player 𝑖 in case of winning or losing is 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖                            with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
−𝑥𝑖                                  with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (11) 
Using our notation, the Tullock contest is defined as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}). The resulting 
best response function in such a contest for player 𝑖 is 
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗 .          (12) 
For a generic contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽1, 𝛽2}) to be strategically equivalent to contest  
Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}) , according to condition (10), we need to impose the following 
restrictions: 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 1 , 𝛼1 = −1  and 𝐿 = 0 . Such restrictions guarantee that the best 
response function (4) is exactly the same as the best response function (12). Therefore, by 
definition these contests are strategically equivalent. 
One particularly interesting case arises when we put further restrictions 𝛽1 = −1 and 
𝛼2 = 𝛽2 = 0. In such a contest, Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1,0, −1,0}), the new payoff function is:  
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗                 with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)
0                                    with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗)
   (13) 
Note that in (13), the winner fully reimburses the loser. This can be interpreted as the ‘Marshall 
system of litigation’ (Baye et al., 2005) in which the winner pays his own legal costs and also 
reimburses all of the legal costs of the loser, whereas the standard Tullock contest can be 
interpreted as the ‘American system of litigation’ in which each litigant pays its own legal 
expenses.8 It can easily be shown that the unique equilibrium for contests defined by (11) and 
(13) is the symmetric equilibrium with 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/4. Moreover, the expected payoff in both 
contests is exactly the same, 𝐸∗(𝜋) = 𝑊/4. Therefore, contests (11) and (13) are strategically, 
                                                 
8
 Also see Matros and Armanios (2009) and Yates (2011) for further examples of this type of contests. 
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effort and payoff equivalent. This equivalence is surprising, since the two contests are intuitively 
and structurally very different. However, it has been also shown in an all-pay auction setting 
under incomplete information (Baye et al., 2005). Therefore, our results provide further evidence 
that Marshall and American systems of litigation are revenue (in our case, effort) and payoff 
equivalent.9 Furthermore, the robustness of the result shows that the seemingly unfair Marshall 
system of litigation indeed result in the same effort and payoff to litigants as the standard 
American system. Hence, it may not be necessary (under the restriction of risk neutrality) for an 
institution to shift from one to another system of litigation. 
It is also straightforward to show that the ‘input spillover’ contest of Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta (2011a) and Baye et al. (2012), where the effort expended by player j partially affects 
player 𝑖 and vice versa, is strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest. The spillover 
contest can be defined as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, 𝛽, 𝛽}), where 𝛽 ∈ (−1,1) is the input spillover 
parameter. This type of contest is motivated by spillover effects in R&D innovation 
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). From strategic equivalence condition 
(10), one can see that for any value of 𝛽, the resulting best response function is exactly the same 
as in (11). Hence, the input spillover contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, 𝛽, 𝛽})  is strategically 
equivalent to the original Tullock contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}). This result suggests that if 
an R&D competition is modeled as a lottery contest, then the existence of symmetric spillovers 
may not affect the equilibrium. However, the ‘input spillover’ contest is not payoff equivalent to 
the original Tullock contest, since condition (9) is not satisfied. It can be easily shown that a 
                                                 
9 There are two structural differences between Baye et al. (2005) and this study. We use a Tullock CSF with 
complete information, whereas Baye et al. (2005) implement an all-pay auction CSF with incomplete information. 
In an all-pay auction the player with the highest effort wins the contest with certainty, whereas in the Tullock 
contest, the player with the highest effort only has a higher probability of winning. Moreover, in an incomplete 
information setting, players do not know about the prize valuation (and other parameters) of its rival, but know only 
about the distribution, whereas in complete information setting everything is common knowledge. 
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positive (negative) spillover provides a higher (lower) payoff to the players than the Tullock 
contest. Hence, our analysis gives further support, from a benevolent policymaker’s point of 
view, to encourage contests with positive spillover and discourage contests with negative 
spillovers. Since in the R&D contests positive spillovers are often related to the Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) issues, a designer might try to manipulate the spillover parameters such 
that the positive spillovers are high enough without damaging the IPR issues. 
 
4.2. Modified Tullock-Type Contests 
Researchers often use modified versions of the original Tullock contests in order to 
address specific questions such as taxes, subsidies, externalities, effort dependent valuations, cost 
differences, etc. There are instances in the literature where two different Tullock-type contests 
are strategically equivalent to each other. Here we briefly discuss some of these examples.  
Chung (1996) assumes that the value of the winning prize depends on the total effort 
expenditures in the contest. A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) model would generate 
the following payoff function: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗) − 𝑥𝑖        with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
 − 𝑥𝑖                                       with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (14) 
Hence, (14) can be described as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝑎 − 1, −1, 𝑎, 0}), where 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), and the best 
response function is 
 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗/(1 − 𝑎)        (15) 
Lee and Kang (1998) study a contest with externalities. In their model the cost of effort 
decreases with the total effort expenditures. This contest can be captured by 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)              with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
−𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)                    with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (16) 
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Hence, (16) can be described as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝑏 − 1, 𝑏 − 1, 𝑏, 𝑏}), where 𝑏 ∈ (0,1), and the best 
response function is 
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗/(1 − 𝑏)        (17) 
When 𝑎 = 𝑏  the best response functions (15) and (17) and the equilibrium effort 
expenditures in the two contests are exactly the same. This result indicates that some contests 
with endogenous prizes, as in Chung (1996), are strategically equivalent to contests with 
externalities, as in Lee and Kang (1998). Also note that, although both contests are strategically 
equivalent, they are not payoff equivalent. In particular, the contest defined by (16) results in 
higher expected payoff than the contest defined by (14), providing a clear Pareto ranking 
between the two contests. Hence, a benevolent contest designer, such as the government trying to 
maximize the total social welfare, may opt to choose a contest that elicits the same level of 
expenditures and, at the same time, results in Pareto improvement for both contestants. 
Next, we consider a ‘limited liability’ contest introduced by Skaperdas and Gan (1995), 
where the loser’s payoff is independent of the efforts expended.10 The authors motivate this 
example by stating that contestants may be entrepreneurs who borrow money to spend on 
research and development and thus are not legally responsible in case of a loss. The loser of such 
a contest is unable to repay the loan and goes bankrupt. In such a case, 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = −1, and the 
other parameters in Ω are zero. The payoff is: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖                            with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
0                                      with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (18) 
The best response function for player 𝑖 is: 
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑥𝑗
2 + 𝑊𝑥𝑗         (19) 
                                                 
10 Example of these kinds of contests can also be found in Matros and Armanios (2009). 
 15 
For a contest to be strategically equivalent to Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1,0,0,0})  the required 
restrictions from (10) are 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 0 , 𝛼1 = −1  and 𝐿 = 0 . When we impose further 
restrictions 𝛼2 = −1 , 𝛽2 = −1  and 𝛽1 = 0  we obtain a contest with the following payoff 
function: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖                           with probability           𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
−𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗                        with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
   (20) 
This contest can be interpreted as a ‘full liability’ contest, since the loser has to pay in full the 
expenditures of both players. Note that although (18) is strategically equivalent to (20), the ‘full 
liability’ contest is (by definition) more risky than the ‘limited liability’ contest. In (18) players 
do not have to worry about what happens in the case of a loss, since they are not legally 
responsible. In contrast, the loser in (20) has to pay the expenditures of both players. Therefore, 
equivalence between (18) and (20) holds only under the assumption of risk neutrality. Moreover, 
it is easy to verify from (9) that contests (18) and (20) are not payoff equivalent. The equilibrium 
payoff in the ‘full liability’ contest is 𝐸∗(𝜋) = 0  and in the ‘limited liability’ contest it is 
𝐸∗(𝜋) = 𝑊/3. This is another specific example in which a contest designer can step in, if he is 
interested in overall payoff. Since the two contests are effort equivalent, but the limited liability 
contest provides the players with a higher payoff, and presumably will need less monitoring than 
the full liability contest, a contest designer may be interested to implement a limited liability 
contest instead of a full liability contest. 
Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) study a ‘rent-shrinking’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, −1,0}), 
where the winning prize value decreases by the total effort expenditures. From (10), a 
strategically equivalent contest would require 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 2, 𝛼1 = −1 and 𝐿 = 0. A ‘lazy 
winner’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −2,0,0}) of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a), in which the 
marginal cost of winning (𝛼1 = −1) is lower than the marginal cost of losing (𝛼2 = −2), 
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definitely satisfies these restrictions. Moreover, the two contests are also payoff equivalent. The 
equivalence between the ‘rent-shrinking’ and ‘lazy winner’ contests enables the designer to 
achieve the same equilibrium rent dissipation using two alternative contests. Nevertheless, the 
‘lazy winner’ contest is, arguably, easier to implement and it is less susceptible to the collusion 
problem mentioned in Alexeev and Leitzel (1996). 
In many cases a contest designer can use different policy tools to implement a certain 
contest. Using the same procedure as before it can be shown that under certain restrictions, 
contests with endogenous valuations (Amegashie, 1999), contests with differential cost structure 
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), and contests with taxes (Glazer and Konrad, 1999), are 
strategically equivalent. Specifically, Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {(1 −
𝑡)𝑤, 0, −(1 − 𝑡), −1,0,0}), in which a part of the rent seeker’s non-negative profit is taxed with 
tax rate 𝑡 ∈ (0,1) . Amegashie (1999) studies a contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −(1 − 𝑚), −1,0,0}) , in 
which the winner’s prize value is a linear function of own effort spent. Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta (2011a) study the ‘lazy winner’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 0,0}) , in which the 
marginal cost of winning is lower than the marginal cost of losing, i.e., |𝛼1| < |𝛼2|.  
Using condition (7), when (1 − 𝑡)𝑤 = 𝑊, 𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 𝑡 = 𝑚, and 𝛼1 = (𝑡 − 1) = (𝑚 −
1) then the three contests are strategically and effort equivalent. The first condition means that 
the take-home winning payoff in the contest with tax should be the same as the basic winning 
prize of the other two contests. The second condition implies that the tax rate in the tax contest 
should be same as the endogenous valuation margin in the endogenous valuation contest. 
Moreover, the difference between winning and losing marginal cost, which has the same effect in 
the lazy winner contest, should also be the same. Finally, and most intuitively, the marginal cost 
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of winning in the lazy winner contest is same as the ‘effective’ marginal costs of winning in the 
other two contests. 
The equivalence between these three seemingly unrelated contests conveys an important 
message. It shows that the designer can either use policy tools, such as taxes, or contests with 
alternative cost structure to achieve the same objective, and it may be easier to implement the 
policy from one domain to another. Moreover, the three contests do not necessarily generate the 
same equilibrium payoffs. The equilibrium payoff (under the restriction of strategic equivalence) 
in Glazer and Konrad (1999) is 𝐸∗(𝜋) = (1 − 𝑡)2W/(4 − 3𝑡) , in Amegashie (1999) it is 
𝐸∗(𝜋) = (1 − 𝑡)𝑊/(4 − 3𝑡) , and in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) it is 𝐸∗(𝜋) = (1 −
𝑡)W/(2 − 3𝑡). Hence, a contest designer, such as a government trying to maximize the social 
welfare, can achieve a Pareto improvement by choosing a specific contest structure that 
generates the highest payoffs for players yet results in the same equilibrium efforts. In specific, 
implementing a contest designed with endogenous valuation might be preferable to the designer 
than implementing a contest with taxation. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we use a two-player Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and 
structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. We define strategically equivalent 
contests as contests that generate the same best response functions. Under the assumption of a 
unique equilibrium, strategically equivalent contests are also effort equivalent. However, 
strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs, and thus may not be 
payoff equivalent. We describe a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent 
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contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the 
original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. 
We reestablish some existing results derived under alternative contest success functions 
and incomplete information, i.e., the equivalence of the American and Marshall systems of 
litigation. We also introduce new results, such as the equivalence between a standard Tullock 
contest and an input spillover contest, as well as the equivalence of a number of Tullock-type 
contests with endogenous valuations, spillovers, and differential cost structures. 
Our findings contribute to the contest design literature by demonstrating how different 
strategically equivalent contests can be used to achieve the same objectives. A contest designer 
may choose to maximize the total rent dissipation, minimize equilibrium efforts, or simply 
enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that the contest designer can achieve these 
objectives by imposing appropriate restrictions on contest parameters. For example, we show 
that the two strategically and effort equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. 
Hence, a contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the 
same efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants. 
It is important to understand the critical conditions required for the equivalence to hold in 
the field. Following the majority of the rent-seeking contests in the literature, we consider a two-
player Tullock-type contest with linear cost and spillover structure under risk neutrality. The 
strategic equivalence results may not hold if we relax one or more of these assumptions. There 
are practical applications in which costs are convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), spillovers 
influence the payoff function in a non-linear manner (Kräkel, 2004), or players are risk averse 
(Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). A different analysis of equivalence would 
be required in such cases.  
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There can also be behavioral factors that may influence individual decisions but are not 
modeled in the current setting. For example, it has been shown in laboratory settings that 
contestants make mistakes (Sheremeta, 2011), have incorrect judgments (Parco et al., 2005; 
Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009), and exhibit non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010; 
Price and Sheremeta, 2011).11 Some of these behavioral factors may distort individual behavior 
in strategically equivalent contests, and thus may break such equivalence.  
There are many interesting extensions that call for future research, such as player 
asymmetry in terms of player specific parametric values or different winning and losing prizes in 
contests. It may also be interesting to apply the equivalence ideas to contests between groups. 
Nevertheless, the concept of strategic equivalence and the two-step procedure (described in 
Section 3) to obtain strategically equivalent contests would be still relevant for such analyses. 
Using the two-step procedure one could, for example, find equivalence conditions with more 
than two players, risk aversion, and non-linear cost/spillover structure. Such analyses as well as 
the empirical tests of the equivalence in the laboratory are left for future research. 
  
                                                 
11 For an extensive review of the experimental literature on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2014) and for a review of 
behavioral explanations see Sheremeta (2013). 
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